Whenever I am asked about the Brazilian elections, people expect me to say something about the presidential run. It is the only election to which I am entitled to participate as a Brazilian living abroad. But it is only one of five choices voters had to make (voting is mandatory). Every four years for the last 26 Brazilians have voted for state governor and state legislature, a third of the senate, and the 513 representatives in congress. It has been this way since the end of the long and painful transition to democracy that started in 1974 with a warning by the general in charge that it was to be “slow, gradual and safe.”

The key to the safety to which the general alluded is the election of the next congress. Bear this in mind: even though the election in two rounds guarantee the president will get more than 50% of the vote, not a single president since 1990 has had more than a hundred representatives from his own party elected to congress. As a result, every presidency since then has been based on an intricate patchwork of heterogeneous alliances to govern. The relative shortcomings of each of the six administrations since 1990, besides their ideological leanings, are to a great extent the result of a majority which has always been – whether prone to corruption or not – very conservative in congress.

Consider, for instance, the two caucuses primarily identified with conservative causes. The so-called ruralistas or agro-business caucus (a modern packaging for the old landowning class that once ruled the country) and conservative evangelicals are together worth at least 235 votes in congress. Different assessments give the Bancada Ruralista between 159 to 227 congressmen and eleven senators. Calculations for the Bancada Evangélica vary from 73 to sixty-six members of the caucus in congress and three senators. Other notorious right-wing special interests’ groups that have had an important role in specific votes in congress are the Bancada da Bala [“Bullet Caucus”] with 11 members that defend the right to bear arms and the interests of the weapon industry and the bancada da Bola [“Football Caucus”] with 7 members that defend the interests of the national and state soccer federations.

These caucuses, especially the first two mentioned, guarantee that the federal administration, regardless of who wins the election, will do nothing substantially different about land distribution, forest conservation, and the rights of indigenous peoples, women or the LGBT community. The political power of the agro-business caucus has its source in the boom in the international commodities market causing a rapid expansion throughout the flatlands of the Midwest on to the north of the country and the encroachment of large properties growing crops such as soy beans and sugarcane. Evangelicals have, with one notable exception,[1] increased their presence in congress after each election in tandem with the fact that, according to the 2010 census, Protestants make up 42.3 million Brazilians or 22.2% of the population, up from a mere 9% in 1990. They are not as homogeneous a group as most people think: evangelicals make up 65% of these Protestants and are split into numerous antagonistic groups – internal conflict divides even the most powerful of the evangelicals, Assembléia de Deus, with 8.5 million members spread all over the country. They all tend to agree, however, on seeing women’s reproductive rights and LGBT marriage and adoption rights as threats to the foundation of society.

Even though almost half of congress seems to get elected on these platforms, too much proximity with the causes identified with these two groups may hurt a campaign for executive office. The agro-business politicians face rejection outside their political turfs and have become infamous for their positions against campaigns that intend to curb modern slavery or widespread logging while religious and class prejudice compounded with rejection of moralistic conservative activism curtail the political appeal of evangelicals beyond their constituencies. This is a good point of entry into some of the puzzles of this year’s presidential campaign.

After the promise of excitement, for the sixth consecutive time, the two candidates with most votes were candidates from PT and PSDB. Disappointment followed the thrill around Marina Silva, who started this campaign as vice-president in the ticket led by Eduardo Campos until he died in a plane crash in July. She ran a shorter campaign with much less time on TV – since mid August one hour of prime time Radio and TV is reserved daily to all the candidates according to the number and size of the parties that support them. But it is undeniable that, after a sudden rise to first place in most opinion polls, Marina Silva frustrated those who thought she could change the course of the election. Neither did she appeal to a more conservative electorate nor could she differentiate herself from PT, the political party in which she built most of her career. The beginning of her fall might have been when Marina Silva backpedaled on support for gay marriage after she was sternly admonished in a series of tweets by pastor Silas Malafaia. She ended up in third with more or less the same support she had four years ago. Silas Malafaia is one of a few US-style televangelists that vie for the leadership of the powerful Assembléia de Deus, organization for the most part under control of 77-year old pastor José Wellington Bezerra da Costa. The candidate for president officially supported by the elders of Assembléia de Deus was pastor Everaldo Pereira, who received a meager 0.75% of the vote.

Most major Brazilian politicians nowadays play a cynical game of mixed messages that try to please the religious electorate without seeming too close to it. Their powerful sway over an important parcel of the working class urban vote explains the uncanny number of “thanks to the Lord,” for example, in the final remarks during presidential debates. Shady alliances practically guarantee the ruralistas will support whoever wins the election and will be duly rewarded for doing so. Too much proximity with these groups during the campaign may hurt the chances of a candidate running for presidency, governorship or even the senate, but, once the election cycle is over, those 235 plus votes will be awaiting at the negotiating table.

Contrary to the cliché in conversations among disenchanted Brazilians, who say politicians are all “farinha do mesmo saco” [flour coming from the same sack], politicians and political parties are quite different. The five democratically elected presidents [Fernando Collor, Itamar Franco, Fernando Henrique Cardoso, Lula and Dilma Roussef] differ widely in style and substance. Inflation went from 80% a month in 1990 to 6% a year in 2014. The minimum wage was around $100 a month in the 1990s and is now well above $300, which means that one of the most unequal countries in the world has finally done something to reverse a perverse trend of income concentration that had been imposed with the 1964 military coup. But the nature of the accomplishments and shortcomings of these administrations can only be properly understood taking into account the elephant in the room: they all dealt with a reactionary congress, some to their advantage, others, not. This political system seems to have exhausted its capacity for meaningful reform and this perhaps explains the explosion of diffused dissatisfaction that shook the streets of every major city in Brazil in June 2013.

Another cliché claims that whatever is going on “could be happening in Brazil only.” But political crises caused by the seeming incapacity of systems of representative democracy to present real alternatives to the fatalistic mantras of financial capitalism are now the rule rather than the exception all over the world. It is hard not to notice the stark contrast between fierce campaigns led by doggedly opposing political groups and administrations that, by and large, offer more or less the same with slight changes in emphasis. The will to project political antagonism between the three major candidates this year did not obscure that all of them carefully followed scripts written by marketing professionals, who “sell” a left-leaning candidate this cycle and a conservative one in the next. Much is made to obscure differences in new proposals for education and healthcare as well as continuities in anti-poverty and anti-hunger as well as economic policies that point to a complaisant acceptance of the conservative political status quo. While the conservative media insist that corruption is a matter of specific politicians appropriating public funds for themselves, the political system becomes universally corrupt because powerful private economic interests hold a tight grasp on the legislative and the executive on federal, state and municipal levels. The system becomes increasingly domesticated and choices narrow down to different versions of more of the same. The malaise is palpable and fuels the prospect of a Berlusconi-style political apparition or the return of neo-liberal orthodoxy to power.

The angst that permeates the election cycle this year can be summed up by one of the most popular slogans of the 2013 demonstrations: “Contra tudo o que está aí” (Against Everything That’s There). A quick retrospective of those events is necessary. The protests led by a group of daring young activists in São Paulo against inefficient costly public transportation were galvanized by the brutality of the police repression documented in traditional and social media. Suddenly, millions joined loosely organized demonstrations ranging from far-left anarchists to conservatives willing to bring back the military to power. Myriad groups chanted slogans against the World Cup, against the media conglomerate Rede Globo, against the police, against the homophobic congressman Marco Feliciano, against president Dilma Rousseff, against state or municipal authorities. Individuals held placards in favor of causes such as the sterilization of pets, “the army of Jesus,” the end of gun control and road tolls. The only slogans more or less universally accepted were either vague such as Vem pra rua (“Come to the Streets!”) or anti-politics such as Sem partido (“No Political Parties!”). Later at night the customary brutality of the military police was met with violent resistance. Media pundits feverishly tried to give the unrest a definitive meaning and politicians were shaken out of their complacency and scrambled to quiet somehow the unrest. For example, in one of his most pathetic moments, political commentator Arnaldo Jabor appeared on the prime time TV news first to excoriate the protesters as spoiled middle-class brats and then a few days later to hail them as great patriots about to change the country. The media was only truly outraged when some of their own were victims of the violence, first by the police and then by the protesters. A discourse was built around the idea of a clear-cut separation between small left-wing bands of evil-spirited but disciplined vandals bent on the subversion of the order and the good folk that made the bulk of the demonstrations.

Ultimately, fare increases were cancelled and in some places prices were even reduced. Then, an infamous corrupt politician was sent to jail. After a long silence and relative complicity with statewide repressive measures, the federal government decided to propose a thorough reform of the political system to be decided by officials elected specifically for that purpose. Outraged reformers suddenly became savvy pragmatists and vice-versa and absolute nothing substantive came out of it. It seems clear now that the only palpable result of those demonstrations “against everything that’s there” was not a Brazilian Berlusconi, but an even more conservative congress: the equivalent of throwing gasoline to try to put out a fire.

The post Beyond the Elections: Politics in Brazil appeared first on The Postcolonialist.

Sempre que me perguntam sobre as eleições no Brasil, as pessoas esperam comentários sobre a disputa presidencial. É a única eleição em que posso participar como brasileiro vivendo no exterior. Mas é apenas uma de cinco escolhas que os eleitores têm que enfrentar. A cada quatro anos os brasileiros votam para governador, deputado estadual, um terço do senado e deputado federal. Assim tem sido nos últimos 26 anos, desde o fim da longa transição para a democracia que começou em 1974 com uma resalva do general em questão de que ela seria “lenta, gradual e segura.”

A chave para a segurança de que falava o general e a eleição do congresso nacional. Para entender claramente o que estou dizendo, é preciso ter em mente que, ainda que a eleição em dois turnos garanta que o presidente eleito tenha sempre mais de 50% dos votos válidos, nenhum presidente eleito desde 1990 teve mais que cem deputados de seu partido no congresso. Por causa disso todos os presidentes desde então governaram com base em uma complicada rede de alianças heterogêneas. As limitações relativas dos seis governos eleitos desde 1990, além das tendências ideológicas de cada um, se explicam em grande medida como resultado de um maioria no congresso que é sempre – independente de tendências à corrupção ou não – muito conservadora.

Consideremos, por exemplo, duas bancadas identificadas com causas conservadoras. Os ruralistas ou a bancada do agro-negócio (uma embalagem supostamente moderna para os descendentes das velhas oligarquias latifundiárias que já comandaram o país) e os evangélicos conservadores juntos tinham pelo menos 235 votos no congresso. Cálculos diferentes dão à Bancada Ruralista entre 159 e 227 deputados e onze senadores. Com respeito à Bancada Evangélica as avaliações variam entre 73 e 66 membros no congresso e três senadores. Outras bancadas conservadoras que eventualmente aparecem com destaque em votações e em comissões no congresso são a Bancada da Bala com 11 membros que defendem os interesses da indústria de armas e a bancada da Bola com 7 membros que defendem os interesses das federações de futebol e dos clubes. Esses votos, principalmente os que vêm das primeiras duas bancadas mencionadas, são a garantia de que o governo federal, não importa quem ganhe as eleições, fará muito pouco de substancial sobre reforma agrária, desmatamento e os direitos dos povos indígenas, das mulheres e da comunidade LGBT.

O poder político da bancada ruralista tem sua fonte no grande crescimento do Mercado internacional de commodities que ocasionou uma rápida expansão pelo planalto central e o norte do país de latifúndios produtores de soja e cana-de-açúcar. Nas últimas eleições os evangélicos, com uma exceção significativa,[1] aumentam sua presença no congresso a cada eleição em sintonia com o crescimento dos protestantes que foram de 9% em 1990 para 22,22% da população brasileira, totalizando 42.3 milhões. Esse não é um grupo tão homogêneo como muita gente pensa: os evangélicos são apenas 65% dos protestantes e estão divididos em vários grupos antagônicos – conflitos internos dividem até mesmo a Assembléia de Deus, igreja mais poderosa com 8.5 milhões de membros por todo o país. Todos os evangélicos parecem estar de acordo, entretanto, em imaginar os direitos reprodutivos das mulheres e o casamento e adoção de crianças por pessoas do mesmo sexo uma ameaça às fundações da sociedade.

Ainda que quase a metade do congresso seja eleita com base nessas plataformas, uma proximidade excessiva com causas identificadas com os dois grupos pode prejudicar uma campanha por um cargo executivo. Políticos ruralistas encaram forte rejeição fora dos seus redutos políticos e têm péssima reputação por combaterem tentativas de reprimir a escravidão ou o desmatamento enquanto preconceitos religiosos e de classe contra os evangélicos pioram por causa da rejeição do ativismo conservador moralista reduzem em muito seu apelo além do seu eleitorado. Está aí uma boa maneira de tentar decifrar um dos mistérios da campanha presidencial deste ano.

Após uma promessa de novidade, pela sexta vez consecutiva os dois candidatos com maior número de votos foram os do PT e do PSDB. Desapontamento acompanhou o frenesi sobre Marina Silva, que começou essa campanha como vice-presidente na chapa de Eduardo Campos até que ele morresse num acidente de avião em julho. Marina fez uma campanha mais curta e com menos tempo de televisão – desde meados de agosto reserve-se uma hora do horário nobre de todas as rádios e canais de televisão para propaganda política dividida de acordo com o número e o tamanho dos partidos de cada coligação. É inegável, entretanto, que após uma ascenção meteórica nas pesquisas de opinião, Marina Silva frustrou aqueles que pensaram que ela poderia mudar o curso das eleições ao se mostrar incapaz de atrair o eleitorado mais conservador sem alienar sua base de apoio formada por eleitores de esquerda insatisfeitos com os rumos tomados pelo PT, partido no qual Marina fez a maior parte da sua carreira. O começo do seu fracasso pode ter sido o momento em que Marina Silva voltou atrás em compromissos de campanha pelo apoio ao casamento entre homossexuais após ter sido severamente advertida pelo pastor pastor Silas Malafaia em uma série de tweets. Marina terminou em terceiro lugar, mais ou menos com o mesmo número de votos.  Silas Malafaia é um televangelista à moda estadounidense que luta pelo controle da poderosa Assembléia de Deus, organização em sua maior parte controlada pelo pastor José Wellington Bezerra da Costa de 77 anos. O candidato apoiado oficialmente pela Assembléia de Deus era o pastor Everaldo Pereira, que recebeu apenas 0.75% do voto.

A maioria dos políticos brasileiros hoje em dia faz um jogo cínico de mensagens mais ou menos indiretas que tentam agradar ao eleitorado religioso sem parecer demasiadamente próximo dele. A força desse eleitorado entre a classe trabalhadora explica o incomum número de graças ao senhor que, por exemplo, aparecem no final dos debates presidenciais. Alianças em manobras de bastidores praticamente garantem que os ruralistas darão apoio a qualquer um que ganhar as eleições e serão bem recompensados por isso. Uma proximidade excessiva com esses grupos durante a campanha pode prejudicar as chances de um candidato a presidência, governo estadual, ou mesmo ao senado, mas, ao fim do ciclo eleitoral, os mais de 235 votos no congress estarão aguardando o novo presidente na mesa de negociações.

Estou completamente em desacordo com o clichê que diz que politicos são todos “farinha do mesmo saco”. Os cinco presidents eleitos democraticamente [Fernando Collor, Itamar Franco, Fernando Henrique Cardoso, Lula e Dilma Roussef] diferem muito em estilo e substância. A inflação foi de 80% ao mês em 1990 para 6% ao ano em 2014. O salário mínimo estava em torno de $100 nos anos 90 e agora está acima de $300, o que significa que um dos países mais desiguais do mundo finalmente dispôs-se a fazer algo para reverter a perversa concentração de renda que foi imposta desde o golpe militar de 1964. Mas a natureza das conquistas e dos limites desses governos só pode ser compreendida levando-se em conta esse pequeno imenso detalhe que raramente figura nas conversas entre brasileiros: todos eles lidaram com um congresso reacionário, alguns a seu favor, outros em seu detrimento. Esse sistema político parece ter exaurido sua capacidade de produzir reformas substanciais e isso talvez explique a explosão de insatisfação difusa que tomou as ruas de todas as cidades brasileiras em junho de 2013.

Discordo de um outro clichê que diz que o que quer que esteja acontecendo “só poderia acontecer no Brasil”. As crises causadas pela aparente incapacidade dos sistemas de democracia representativa de apresentar alternativas reais aos mantras do capitalismo financeiro são antes a regra do que a exceção no século XXI. Não é difícil perceber o contraste gritante entre campanhas eleitorais ferozes entre grupos políticos polarizados e programas de governo que oferecem mais ou menos a mesma coisa com pequenas diferenças de ênfase. A vontade de projetar antagonismo entre os três candidatos com chances e vitória este ano não pode obscurecer o fato de que os três tentaram seguir scripts cuidadosamente escritos por profissionais de marketing que “vendem” um candidato progressista hoje e um candidato conservador amanhã. Faz-se muito para disfarçar diferenças entre propostas para a educação e saúde assim como as continuidades em políticas contra a fome e a pobreza assim como políticas econômicas que se baseiam numa aceitação complacente do status quo capitalista. Enquanto a mídia insiste que a corrupção é uma questão de políticos se apropriando de fundos públicos, o sistema político torna-se universalmente corrupto por causa de interesses econômicos que mantém controle do legislativo e do executivo nas esferas federal, estadual e municipal. O sistema se domestica cada vez mais e as escolhas se resumem e versões ligeiramente diferentes do mesmo. O mal estar é palpável e cresce a possibilidade da aparição política de algum Berlusconi ou o retorno da ortodoxia neoliberal ao poder.

A angústia que perpassou grande parte do ciclo eleitoral deste ano pode resumir-se em um dos mais populares slogans das manifestações de 2013: “Contra tudo o que está aí”. Faz-se necessária uma rápida retrospectiva dos eventos do ano passado. Os protestos organizados por um grupo ousado de jovens ativistas de São Paulo contra o alto-custo e ineficiência do transporte público ganharam uma nova dimensão com a brutalidade policial documentada pela mídia tradicional e pelas mídias sociais. De repente milhões se juntaram a protestos organizados de forma difusa por grupos de iam da extrema esquerda anarquista aos conservadores dispostos a trazer de volta os militares ao poder. Grupos os mais variados criavam gritos de guerra contra a Copa do Mundo, contra a Rede Globo, contra a polícia, contra o deputado homofóbico Marco Feliciano, contra a presidenta Dilma Rousseff, contra autoridades estaduais ou municipais. Indivíduos isolados seguravam cartazes a favor de causas como a esterilização dos animais domésticos, “o exército de Jesus” ou o fim do controle às armas de fogo e dos pedágios. Os únicos slogans aceitos de forma mais ou menos universal eram aqueles que primavam por serem vagos como “Vem pra rua” ou anti-política como “Sem partido”. Mais tarde à noite a costumeira brutalidade policial encontrava resistência violenta. Especialistas na mídia tentavam freneticamente dar um sentido definitivo a agitação social generalizada e a classe política saiu da sua complacência habitual para tentar aplacar a ira pública. Em um dos seus momentos mais patéticos, o comentarista Arnaldo Jabor apareceu no horário nobre criticando asperamente os manifestantes caracterizados como piralhos mimados de classe média e, poucos dias depois, celebrando os mesmos como grandes patriotas capazes de mudra o país. A mídia se indignava seletivamente com a violência quando esta atingia um dos seus, primeiro pela ação da polícia e depois dos manifestantes. Um discurso se construiu em torno de uma separação clara entre pequenos grupos organizados de vândalos mal-intencionados dispostos a tudo para subverter a ordem e a boa gente que era maioria nas manifestações.

Aumentos de passagens foram cancelados e em algumas cidades preços foram reduzidos; um político condenado por corrupção foi mandado para a prisão. Após um longo silêncio e relativa cumplicidade com as medidas repressivas tomadas pelos governos estaduais, o governo federal decidiu propor uma completa reforma do sistema político a ser proposta por uma constituinte eleita especificamente para esse propósito. Reformistas ultrajados de repente se transformaram em pragmáticos cautelosos e vice-versa e nada de substancial foi feito. Até agora parece que o único resultado palpável dos protestos “contra tudo o que está aí” não foi um Berlusconi brasileiro, mas um congresso ainda mais reacionário: o equivalente de atirar gasolina para tentar apagar o fogo.

The post Sobre Eleições Brasileiras appeared first on The Postcolonialist.

With only a few days left before Brazil’s presidential election on October 5th, and so many important social issues under scrutiny (see this review, for example), the political and ideological novela of Brazil remains a cliffhanger. Instead of prediction and pontification on the federal level, I will discuss a policy turn on a somewhat smaller scale, the municipal level of São Paulo. Current events in the huge city provoked me to consider the following: what happens to a society when urbanization is completely driven by profit? If there is to be any social development of urban space, what might that look like?

During my last stay from May to August of 2014 something unusual occurred, the mayor of São Paulo created the “Directive Plan” (Plano Diretor, referred to for the rest of this essay as PD), a new complement to the City Statute (2001). In fact, it was far from a solo effort on the part of Mayor Fernando Haddad (PT). Rather, over nine months of debate, involving 114 public discussions (audiências públicas) including directly more than 25,000 residents, the urban development plan was created on June 30, 2014 and signed into law on July 30th. With a mandate of sixteen years to “humanize” urban development, valorize the environment, bring urbanization more in line with “social function,” and to support “cultural initiatives,” the PD experiment in São Paulo deserves everyone’s notice.

Yes, we’ve gotten to that point. For generations, ever since the boom of industrialization and the great modernist wave of roller coaster finances thrust São Paulo into the economic limelight in the early 20th century, the city has lacked a serious plan. Urbanization has occurred for the most part in function of real estate speculation with millions of displaced, migrant residents improvising residential and commercial spaces as well as basic services such as electricity, water and transportation. São Paulo has taken shape as a result of short-term deals amplified by a massive infrastructure of commercial media rather than sustained socio-geographical plans.

Why the PD now? There has been a change from above and below. Namely, Haddad has been comparatively more proactive than previous labor party or progressive mayors, i.e. Marta Suplicy (2001-2004) and Luiza Erundina (1989-1992). Taken overall, São Paulo city administrations have overtly supported “wild west” development combined with repressive police forces to control popular protests. The Worker’s Party or anything like it rarely wins in São Paulo. Perhaps, a more important change has been the grassroots attitude and organization around the issue of housing or moradia. Occupying and repurposing abandoned buildings for residency and cultural centers have become commonplace these days, especially in downtown districts but also in some periphery neighborhoods. Groups such as FLM (The Struggle for Housing Front) and MTST (Homeless Worker’s Movement) have been central players in raising awareness of the increasingly urgent issues regarding housing and real estate speculation.

The PD is a new, robust attempt to reestablish the “social” in urban development. Real estate speculation is a game of low to no risk for the elite who have the capital. They benefit from not only media propaganda, filled with dreamscape flyers distributed at almost every traffic light, billboards on avenues and highways, and internet sidebar advertisement, but also frequently state support. One wing of the anti-World Cup protests targeted precisely the connections between mega-event development and the rise of real estate speculation.

It is not that the political administrations of years past did not take into account urban planning. Bureaucratic bodies such as EMURB (Empresa Municipal de Urbanização de São Paulo / Municipal Company of São Paulo Urbanization) have existed for decades. Created in 1971, EMURB’s objectives were to use public funds in the service of renovating historic buildings such as the Martinelli skyscraper, a landmark of modern São Paulo industry and elite management. However, there was never any mention of sustainable development and very little in popular housing development beyond far-flung housing projects, which often demonstrated the worst side of populism, shoddy infrastructure resulting in quick political gain and eventual  scandal. In 2009, EMURB was divided into two public companies. The SMDU (Secretaria Municipal de Desenvolvimento Urbano / The Municipal Secretary of Urban Development) is the more pertinent agency. In May of 2013 the SMDU was reorganized in prediction of a potential PD ordinance.

In a newly designed map of São Paulo, the government has divided the city into sectors to highlight the specific goals of the PD. The categories of proposed sustainable and egalitarian development approach the problem from both micro (neighborhood) and macro (the city as whole) levels. For example, territory and society come together in one of the initiatives, referred to as ZEIS (Zonas Especiais de Interesse Social / Special Zones of Social Interest). In its current version, the project stipulates that the city will use public funds to develop up to 33 square kilometers (approx. 12.75 square miles), sixty percent of which is for families whose income is below 3 minimum wages (roughly 900 US$ a month). In contrast to previous public housing, this construction is designed not to be relegated to the periphery but rather be part of downtown and historic neighborhoods such as Bela Vista, Brás, Santa Ifigênia, Campos Eliséus and Pari. In addition, similar to a set of urbanization laws in New York City, the PD calls for a “solidarity quota,” which stipulates that any owner (corporate or individual) of a property unit with an area above 20,000 square meters (approx. 215,000 square feet) must dedicate 10% of the space to “social” housing in compliance with the City Statute. This space must be located either in that construction site or in an area in the same district.

Inspiring changes but will they stick?

In Brazil, belief in the state and law is always posed in terms of fiscalização, the tricky process of policy regulation. As noted several times in the past two months by Raquel Rolnik in her watchdog blog, there is currently a disconnect between the PD and the grounded reality of law enforcement. As signaled above, the squatters and activists certainly know what the PD entails, since they and their representatives contributed to its formulation. However, the same cannot be said for the police or, unfortunately, many judges as they continue to ignore or refuse to accept the concept of the city’s social function. For real estate investors the “social function” of urban planning represented by the new PD is a drain on profit and an unwarranted obstacle to development. This cadre has plenty of mouthpieces at their disposal to blame the city for causing speculation. Brutal irony meets feigned ignorance.

The vision of the Plano Diretor is that a city must be organized as a human right not an economic resource. A city cannot be equated to diamonds or internet technology. For government, this sort of entrepreneurial development is of secondary importance. Rather, the primary function of city management should be the allocation and regulation of space as a contributing gesture towards the common good. Given the fact that the majority of us now live in cities and that this trend will only intensify, we all indeed have a stake in what happens in São Paulo. 

The post Lessons from São Paulo: A Deserved Shift in Urbanization Policy appeared first on The Postcolonialist.